ABSTRACT Recently, a plaintext-related image encryption scheme based on a hyper-chaotic system has been proposed by Li et al. In their encryption scheme, the permutation process is related to the sum of plaintext pixel values, and the diffusion process is related to the values of nine special positions in the permuted image. This can resist the existing chosen plaintext attack due to the ever-changing permutation matrix and diffusion matrix when the plaintext is changed. Here, we show that Li's encryption scheme contains two vulnerabilities. First, the gray values of the nine specific pixels do not change during diffusion. Second, the permutation process is reversible. Therefore, the diffusion process can be attacked and the permuted image can be obtained by constructing a special image, where the nine special position values in the special image's permuted image are the same as those in the cipher image. Then, if the obtained permuted image is chosen as plaintext, we can get its permuted image by attacking the diffusion process. Since the permutation process is reversible, the permuted image is the original plaintext image. In addition, some improvements for Li's encryption scheme are provided to enhance the security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the rapid development of computer network technology, images containing private information, such as medical images and military satellite images, are transmitted through a network. Therefore, information security issues are attracting increasing attention from researchers. However, traditional cryptographic techniques, such as data encryption standard (DES) and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), are no longer suitable for image encryption due to some features in the image data, such as bulk data capacity and high correlation among pixels. As a result, an image encryption algorithm with high confidentiality that is difficult to crack is required to prevent image data from being stolen during storage and transmission. In recent years, chaos theory has been widely used in image encryption, since chaos is sensitive to initial conditions and has controllable variables, pseudorandomness, and a simple structure [1] , [2] .
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Chien-Ming Chen. In 1998, Fridrich proposed a classical image encryption structure of permutation-diffusion (PD) [3] , which divided the image encryption procedure into two steps: permutation and diffusion. The location of every pixel is transformed to generate a new image that cannot be recognized visually through permutation, while the pixel value is modified using a chaotic signal to maximize information entropy through diffusion. Subsequently, numerous encryption algorithms based on Fridrich's structure were proposed [4] - [15] , [19] - [41] . In 2012, Wang et al. proposed a novel color image encryption algorithm based on chaos [14] . Their method can be used to encrypt the red-green-blue components of a color image simultaneously, and it can also force the three components to interact with each other. This reduces correlation between the three components, thus, improving security. In 2017, Pak et al. presented a new color image encryption using a combination of two chaotic maps [15] . The method in [15] produced a new chaotic system by using the differences between two identical chaotic maps. This method used a new linear-nonlinear-linear structure, which adds a rotation operation to the classical PD structure. Therefore, the algorithm's security is improved by expanding the chaotic range of the system. In 2017, a color image encryption method where a rectangular transformation was combined with a chaotic tent map was proposed [38] . This technique can be used to encrypt three channels of plaintext simultaneously as well as generate a key stream related to plaintext images. The three encrypted channels are related to each other and the sensitivity of the secret key is increased. In addition, in recent years, compressive sensing [35] , DNA [36] , [37] , and other technologies have been used for chaotic image encryption, which provides the algorithm with improved security.
Importantly, these methods are not necessarily safe, as chaotic signals used in the encryption process are not associated with plaintext images, i.e., the secret key streams of different plaintext images are fixed. Therefore, these methods cannot resist chosen-plaintext attacks. For example, the cryptosystem proposed in Ref. [14] was cryptanalyzed using the chosen-plaintext attack [16] . The diffusion rule is obtained from a true color image (i.e., the matrix containing RGB pixels is filled with zeros), and the permutation matrix is obtained from the relationship between the positions of pixels in some chosen images and the corresponding pixels in permuted images. The encryption algorithm proposed in Ref. [15] has been cracked by chosen-plaintext attack [17] , [18] . In Ref. [17] , authors stated that the linearnonlinear-linear structure in Ref. [15] can be equivalent to the classic PD structure. The equivalent encryption algorithm can be cracked by using the method similar to that in Ref. [16] . In Ref. [18] , the rotation factor is revealed by building a direct relationship between the permuted image and the ciphered image. Then, the permutation matrix and the diffusion matrix can be attacked with a strategy similar to that in Ref. [16] . The method in [38] was also broken by utilizing the chosenplaintext attack. In Ref. [43] , the key stream used in diffusion was exposed from the ciphered image of a special plaintext image whose pixel values were all zero. The permuted image can be recovered successfully through reverse diffusion. The permutation matrix can also be obtained from some special images, with 255 pixel values are 1, 2, 3, . . . , 255, while the other values are all zero. A strategy for breaking the encryption scheme in Ref. [37] was proposed in Ref. [42] . First, the diffusion process is eliminated with a simple calculation, and an equivalent permutation matrix and replacement matrix are obtained from the chosen-plaintext attack. As a result, it is necessary to develop a chaotic image encryption algorithm that can resist chosen-plaintext attacks.
In response to the above security vulnerabilities, Li et al. related the key stream to the plaintext for improving the security [45] . During the permutation process, the initial conditions are determined by the secret key and the sum of total pixel values, i.e., the permutation matrix of two plainimages with different sum of pixel values are different, even though they have the same secret key. During the diffusion process, the initial condition is related to the key and to the values of nine specific pixels in the permuted image, i.e., if nine specific pixel values in the permuted image are different from those in another permuted image, then the two images will use different diffusion matrices for encryption even though they have the same key. The permutation and diffusion processes in this scheme are related to plaintext, and different information is extracted from the plaintext in the two processes. Thus, the encryption algorithm can resist the plaintext attack [16] - [18] , [42] - [44] . The encryption scheme reported in Ref. [45] appears to be secure and not easily broken; an attack on this method has not been reported previously.
Although the encryption scheme in Ref. [45] is related to plaintext information and has high security, we find that the method has two security vulnerabilities. First, the gray values of the nine specific pixels do not change during diffusion. Second, the permutation process is reversible. In other words, the plaintext image can be obtained after applying the same permutation operation on the permuted image. Based on these two vulnerabilities, a new method to decipher the encryption algorithm in Ref. [45] is proposed in this paper.
An overview of the proposed method is given as follows. For the convenience of description, the target plaintext, permuted image, and cipher-image are denoted as P, D, and C, respectively. Since the values of nine specific pixels are not changed during the diffusion process, we can construct a special image E whose permuted image is E1. The values of the nine specific pixels in E1 are same as those in the target cipher image C, while the other pixel values are zeros (see section III.B.1. Let image E be the plaintext image, which is encrypted to produce the ciphered image E2. The diffusion matrix S can be obtained from the relationship between E1 and E2 (see section III.B.2). The permuted image D can be obtained from C and S by reverse diffusion. Let image D be the plaintext image, which is encrypted to produce the cipher image D2. After these operations are repeated, permutation-image D1 of the plaintext D is generated. Finally, the image D1 is the target plaintext P to be attacked; this is possible because the permutation process in Ref. [45] is reversible.
In order to overcome the security vulnerability discussed in Ref. [45] , we offer the following improvements. Regarding the problem that the values of the nine specific pixels are unchanged during diffusion, the secret key is used to generate a permutation vector with length of nine. These nine pixels are permuted using this permutation vector after the image is diffused. In this way, it is difficult to construct a special image whose permuted image meets the conditions that the values of these nine pixels are the same as those in the target image. For the reversible permutation process, we do not use the way like that in Ref. [45] , which exchanges the positions of two pixels. In this paper, we first convert the original image into a one-dimensional vector during permutation and then reorder the one-dimensional vector according to the order of the chaotic sequence values. After these two improvements, the method outlined in this paper can be used to effectively resist the existing chosen-plaintext attack. This paper is organized as follows. We provide an overview of the encryption scheme from Ref. [45] in Section II. The corresponding cryptanalysis is given in Section III. Ideas to improve the original image cipher are presented in Section IV. Experimental analysis and comparison is given in Section V. Conclusions are reported in Section VI.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PLAINTEXT-RELATED IMAGE ENCRYPTION SCHEME (PRIES)
This section provides an introduction to PRIES [45] . This method uses the classical permutation-diffusion structure, the principle of which is shown in Figure 1 . The core of the encryption algorithm consists of three parts: utilizing a hyper-chaotic system and plaintext to generate key streams, permutation, and diffusion.
For the convenience of description, assume that P is the plaintext image, C is the encrypted image, and D is the permuted image.
A. HYPER-CHAOTIC SYSTEM
The hyper-chaotic system utilized in PRIES is defined in Eq. (1):
where α, β, θ, and γ are parameters as reported in Ref. [45] .
B. PERMUTATION ALGORITHM
In PRIES, the permutation matrix is related to the sum of all pixel values in the plaintext image. The sum of all pixel values in different images is often different, thus different images will have different permutation matrices. This feature can resist the existing chosen-plaintext attack algorithms, such as the attack algorithms presented in various studies [16] - [18] , [42] - [44] . The permutation algorithm used in PRIES is summarized as follows:
Step 1. The sum of all pixel values in the plaintext image is calculated, denoted as SUM . SUM is encrypted using the SHA256 algorithm, yielding H − SUM .
Step 2. H − initialKey is obtained by encrypting the initial secret key with the SHA256 algorithm. An bitwise XOR (exclusive OR) operation is applied to H − initialKey and H − SUM to generate IC1, which then is encrypted using the SHA256 algorithm to yield IC2.
Step 3. IC2 is split into four parts: A1, A2, A3, and A4. The initial conditions Ax0, Ay0, Az0, and Aw0 in the hyper-chaotic system are obtained from Eq. (2): Step 4. Ax0, Ay0, Az0, and Aw0 are used to drive the hyperchaotic system and generate a continuous chaotic signal x, which is sampled with a 0.002 step size to produce S1.
Step 5. Substitute S1 into Eq. (3) to get S2. Remove all the repeated values and process S2 to the index sequence X without repeated elements:
Step 6. The input plaintext image is converted into a onedimensional vector, denoted as A. A(X i ) is substituted with A(X M×N−i+1 ).
Step 7. The one-dimensional vector A is transformed to an M × N image, which is the permuted image D.
C. DIFFUSION ALGORITHM
The diffusion matrix in the PRIES diffusion algorithm is related to the pixel values of nine special positions in the permuted image. The positions of these nine special points in the plaintext image are uncertain and are related to permutation algorithm associated with the plaintext. Thus, the diffusion algorithm is also related to the plaintext image. In this case, different plaintext images will have different diffusion matrices. The PRIES diffusion process is summarized as follows:
Step 1 The pixel values of the nine special positions are combined into a 72 bit sequence, which is denoted as PS.
Step 2. The initial key is encrypted using the SHA256 algorithm to obtain 256 bit KS. The 1-72 bit of KS is denoted as KS1. The 73-256 bit of KS is denoted as KS2. KS3 is obtained by applying a bitwise XOR operation to KS1 and PS. KS3 and KS2 are subsequently recombined to produce a new sequence called TS1.
Step 3. TS2 is obtained by encrypting TS1 using the SHA256 algorithm. TS2 is then split into four parts, denoted as B1, B2, B3, and B4. The initial conditions, Bx0, By0, Bz0, and Bw0, of the hyper-chaotic system are obtained using Eq. (4): Step 4. Bx0, By0, Bz0, and Bw0 are utilized to drive the hyper-chaotic system to generate a chaotic continuous signal x, which is sampled with a 0.002 step size to obtain X.
Step 5. X is substituted into Eq. (5) to produce the diffusion matrix S:
Step 6. The pixel values of the nine special positions remain unchanged during diffusion. The pixel values at other positions are diffused using Eq. (6) to obtain the encrypted image C:
where C (m) is the processed result, D (m) is the pixel value of permuted image, S (n) is the key for encrypting this pixel, and C (m − 1) is the previously processed pixel.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS AND ATTACK
Before attacking Li's encryption method outlined in Ref. [45] , we present four propositions that will be used for cracking. For convenience, the original plaintext, permuted image, and ciphertext image are denoted as P, D and C, respectively. The permutation matrix is denoted as X, the diffusion matrix is denoted as S, and the pixel values at the nine special points are denoted as d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d 9 , in order.
A. PROPOSITIONS USED FOR THE ATTACK
Proposition: If the sum of the pixels in the plaintext image P1 equals that in plaintext image P2, then they have the same permutation matrix X when image P1 and P2 have the same initial secret key. Proof: Since the sum of pixel values in P1 equals that in P2, and the images have the same initial secret key, the initial conditions in the hyper-chaotic system used for permuting P1 and P2 are the same in steps 1 ∼ steps 3 in section II.B. Thus, the two hyper-chaotic systems generate the same signal under the same initial conditions. Furthermore, from steps 4 ∼ steps 6 in section II.B, P1 and P2 have the same permutation matrix X when they are encrypted.
Proposition 2: If D is obtained by permuting P, and D1 is obtained by permuting D, then D1 = P when P and D have the same initial key.
Proof: Since the permutation process only changes pixels' position rather than the pixel values, the sum of the pixel values does not change after permutation. Therefore, the sum of the pixel values of P is equal to that of D. Similarly, the sum of the pixel values of D is equal to that of D1. According to Proposition 1, the permutation matrices X for P1 and P2 are equal when these images are encrypted. Therefore, we can denote the permutation matrix X as X = [X(1), X(2), · · · , X(M × N )], which is used in the permutation process. P is converted into a one-dimensional vector A by column. Let P ij be the ith row and jth column in P (P ij is an arbitrary elements in P). The order of P ij in the one-dimensional vector A is the X(a) th element:
According to the permutation algorithm (step 6 in section II.B), we have
Then, D1 is obtained by permuting D and we have
Eqs. (7) and (9) show that the pixel value at an arbitrary position in P is the same as that at the corresponding position in D. Therefore, D1 = P. Proposition 3: ∃E whose permuted image E1 satisfies Eq. (10):
Proof: Since image E1 is a known image, we suppose E2 is the permutation of E1. We have E2 = E according to Proposition 2. Therefore, ∃E whose after permutation E1 satisfies Eq. (10).
Proposition 4: With the same initial secret key, E2 is the diffused image of image E1, which satisfies Proposition 3, where the diffusion matrix used is S . Let C be the diffused image of D, where the diffusion matrix is S. Therefore, S = S.
Proof: It is clear that the pixel values in E1 and D at the nine special positions are the same. According to step 1 in section II.C, the sequence PS composed of pixel values at the nine special positions is also same. Since the diffusion matrix is only related to PS for a given initial secret key, we have S = S. VOLUME 7, 2019 
B. CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT ATTACK ON Li'S ENCRYPTION SYSTEM
The diffusion matrix in Ref. [45] is determined by the pixel values from the nine special positions in the permuted image and the secret keys. After diffusion, the pixel values at the nine special positions are unchanged, and therefore they can be obtained from the ciphertext image C. The attack process begins from this concept. i) A special image E that satisfies Proposition 3 is constructed.
ii) E is chosen as plaintext. The diffusion matrix S used in encrypting image E can be obtained from the permuted image E1 and the ciphertext image E2. According to Proposition 4, S is equal to S, which is the diffusion matrix used in the original image encryption process.
iii) D can be obtained from the ciphertext image C and the diffusion matrix S.
iv) D is chosen as plaintext and encrypted in the same way. The resulting permuted image D1 can be obtained by repeating the procedure in steps i-iii presented above (see section III.B.3). According to Proposition 2, image D1 is the original plaintext image P to be deciphered.
1) CONSTRUCTING THE SPECIAL IMAGE E
Constructing the special image E is the first step in attacking an image. The construction steps are as follows.
Step 1. The positive integer n that satisfies Eq. (11) can be determined from the sum of the pixel values from the nine special positions values Step 2. A vector F = [1, 2, 3, · · · n − 1, n 1 , 0, 0, · · · 0] in one row and with M × N columns is constructed, where:
Obviously, n ≤ n 1 < n + (n + 1). Thus, there are n different non-zero elements in F.
Step 3. F is converted into M × N matrix G, which is encrypted and its cipher image G2 is obtained.
Step 4. If the pixel values at the nine special positions in G2 are all zero, then go to Step 7.
Step 5. If the pixel values at the nine special positions in G2 exist nonzeros, then the position of the corresponding elements in vector F can be obtained from these nonzero positions. The position is lc i , i = 1, 2, 3 · · · 9, e.g., if G2(1, 1) = 0, then the element in F whose value equals G2(1, 1) is located, where lc 1 is the element position number in F. Similarly, if G2(1, N /2) = 0, then the element in F whose value equals G2(1, N /2) is located, where lc 2 is the element order number in F. If G2(M , N ) = 0, then the element in F whose value equals G2(M , N ) is located, where lc 9 is the element order number in vector F.
Step 6. If lc 1 , lc 2 · · · lc 9 are all assigned, then proceed to
Step 8, or else, proceed to Step 7.
Step 7. F ← (F >> n), that is F is right circular shifted by n elements. Then proceed to Step 3.
Step 8. Let F = [0, 0, 0, · · · 0], which is an all-zero vector with one row and M × N columns. F is rewritten as F (lc 1 
. . , F (lc 9 ) = d 9 and the remining elements in F are zeros.
Step 9. The sequence F is converted into an M × N matrix. This is the image E that satisfies Proposition 3.
Noted that Eq. (12) guarantees that the sum of all pixel values in G is equal to that of image E. From Proposition 1, the permutation matrix used to encrypt E is equal to that of image G with the same initial secret key. Since the pixel values at the nine special positions remain unchanged during diffusion, the corresponding relationships between the nine special positions in G2 and their original positions in G are the same as that between the nine special positions in E1 and their original positions in E. When the corresponding relationship between the special positions in G2 and their original positions in G are found, E can be obtained using this corresponding relationship from E1.
The pseudo code for constructing E is shown in Appendix.
2) ATTACK DIFFUSION PROCESS
The special image E is obtained in section III.B.1. Then, the output ciphertext image E2 can be obtained by encrypting E. Since E1 is the permutation of E, which can be obtained from the ciphertext image C (the pixel values at the nine special positions in E1 are equal to those in C, while the remaining pixel values are 0 in E1), the diffusion matrix S of the encrypted image E can be obtained using Eq. (13):
According to Proposition 4, we have S = S. D is the permuted image of P and it can be obtained from S and C using Eq. (14):
A block diagram of the attacking diffusion process is shown in Figure. 2.
3) ATTACK PERMUTATION PROCESS
The permutation matrix in the permutation rule of the encryption scheme in [45] is determined from the sum of pixel values in the original image and the initial secret key. The permuted image D can be obtained by attacking the diffusion process. According to Proposition 2, if D is obtained by permuting P, then P can be obtained by permuting D in the case where the same initial secret key is used, i.e., the plaintext image can be obtained by permuting the original image twice. Since D can be obtained by following the procedure in section III.B.2, we only need to obtain D1, which is the permutation of D.
The steps for attacking the permutation process:
Step 1. Choose the image D, which has been obtained by attacking the diffusion process in section III.B.2 as the plaintext image. Encrypt image D and obtain its ciphertext image D2.
Step 2. Reconstruct a special imageẼ according to the concept in III.B.1. Note that the pixel values at the nine special positions in its permuted imageẼ1 are equal to the corresponding pixel values in D2. The remaining pixel values inẼ1 are 0.
Step 3.Ẽ is taken as a plaintext image and encrypted, yielding its ciphertext imageẼ2. The diffusion matrix of E is obtained using Eq. (15) . From Proposition 4 and section III.B.2, the diffusion matrix in the image encryption process S˜ is equal toS:
Step 4. D1 is determined using Eq. (16). According to Proposition 2, the image D1 is the plaintext image P.
A block diagram of the attacking permutation process is shown in Figure. 3.
C. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
Simulations were conducted in MATLAB R2016a. The parameters of the hyper-chaotic system were set as α = 9, β = 3, θ = 26, and γ = −1. The initial secret key obtained through encryption is shown in Figure 5b . The image recovered from the attack is shown Figure 5c , which matches the plaintext image.
IV. IMPROVED ENCRYPTION SCHEME A. PROBLEMS DESCRIPTION
From the analysis presented in section III, the encryption method in Ref. [45] has two vulnerabilities. First, the original plaintext image can be obtained by performing the same permutation operation on the permuted image; thus, the permutation process can be cracked without knowing the permutation matrix. Second, the pixel values at the nine special positions in the diffusion process are unchanged, and therefore the attacker can easily determine the nine pixel values from the ciphertext image, thereby attacking the diffusion process easily.
In order to improve security, the following two improvements are proposed.
1) During permutation, the one-dimensional vector S2 obtained from Eq. (3) is processed into an index sequence X without duplicate values. A one-dimensional vector A (A (i) = A (X (i))) is reconstructed instead of substituting A(X i ) with A(X M×N−i+1 ), as was done in Ref. [45] . The permuted image D is obtained by converting A into a matrix. In this way, the original plaintext image cannot be obtained by permuting D. The permutation process can be effectively attacked only when the permutation matrix is known a priori.
2) The pixel values at the nine special positions are permuted again after diffusion. It is difficult to construct special images that satisfy Proposition 3 and subsequently attack the diffusion process.
B. IMPROVED PERMUTATION ALGORITHM
The steps in the improved permutation algorithm are as follows:
Steps 1-5 match Steps 1-5 in section II.B.
Step 6. The input plaintext image is converted into a onedimensional vector A. Let A (i) = A (X (i)), where i is an integer and i ∈ [1, M × N/2].
Step 7. The permuted one-dimensional vector A is converted into a two-dimensional image matrix, yielding the permuted image D.
C. IMPROVED DIFFUSION ALGORITHM
The improved diffusion algorithm proposed herein involves adding a 9-pixel permutation process after diffusion. In this case, the attacker cannot easily determine the true pixel values at the nine points, which improves the security of the encryption system. The principle block diagram of the 9-pixel permutation method is shown in Figure 4 and its steps are as follows:
Step 1. The initial secret key is encrypted with the SHA256 algorithm to generate KS (256 bits). Denote 185-256 bits of KS as KS4, and 1-184 bits in KS are denoted as KS5. KS4 is then converted into a sequence KT = {t 1 , t 2 , · · · t 9 }, where each element in KT is 8 bit. The nine elements are sorted in ascending order to generate K = {k 1 , k 2 , · · · k 9 }, which is used for permutation.
Step 2.
The pixel values at the nine special positions are combined in the diffused image as a one-dimensional sequence DT 1 = {d1, d2, d3 . . . d9}.
Step 3. The nine elements in the sequence DT 1 are obtained using Eq. (17), yielding a new sequence
Step 4. The pixel values at the nine special positions are substituted into the diffused image with nine elements in the sequence DT 2, yielding C.
The 9-pixel permutation decryption process is the reverse process of the 9-pixel permutation algorithm due to its symmetric structure. The initial secret key and cipher image C are input into the 9-pixel decryption permutation, yielding the diffused image C (i.e., that before the 9-pixel permutation).
The pixel values at the nine special position can be obtained as follows:
Step 1. This follows Step 1 in the 9-pixel permutation algorithm to obtain the index sequence K = {k 1 , k 2 , · · · k 9 }.
Step 2 .
The pixel values at the nine special positions in the cipher image are combined into a one-dimensional sequence
Step 3. The nine elements in the sequence DT 2 are rearranged using Eq. (18) to obtain a new sequence DT 1 = {d1, d2, d3 . . . d9}: Step 4. The pixel values at the nine special positions in the cipher image are substituted into the nine elements in the sequence DT1, yielding the diffused image (i.e., that before the 9-pixel permutation).
V. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
The test was conducted with MATLAB R2016a. The same initial secret key and control parameters used in Li's encryption scheme were used in the test. The control parameters in the hyper-chaotic system are α = 9, β = 3, θ = 26, and γ = −1, and the initial secret key (in hexadecimal) is FEDCBA9876543210123 456789ABCDEF. Four classical images were used for the security test. The plaintext images and the corresponding encrypted images are shown in the first and third columns in Figure 6 , respectively.
A. RESISTANCE TO CHOSEN PLAINTEXT ATTACK
The proposed cryptosystem against plaintext attacks is discussed in this section. An attacker can gain access to an encrypted machine temporarily, and special images can be constructed to obtain the corresponding ciphertext. Significant information regarding the encryption scheme can be obtained, thereby cracking the encryption scheme.
In our improved cryptosystem, the permutation process is related to the sum of plaintext pixel values. The plaintextrelated permutation process can resist the chosen-plaintext attack. Moreover, the diffusion matrix is related to the pixel VOLUME 7, 2019 values at the nine special positions in the permuted image. Furthermore, the improved method changes positions of the nine pixels in the diffused image. The 9-pixel permutation process is determined by an initial secret key. The attacker cannot easily obtain the nine true pixel values from the cipher image without the initial secret key. Thus, the proposed cryptosystem can sufficiently resist plaintext attacks. Figure 6 shows histograms of the plaintext image and its corresponding ciphertext image. One can clearly see that the plaintext image histograms (the second column in Figure 6 ) are not uniform, while the ciphertext image histograms (the fourth column in Figure 6 ) are fairly uniform. This indicates that our improved algorithm can resist statistical attacks.
B. HISTOGRAM ANALYSIS
Histograms of the cipher image obtained with the image cryptosystem are uniform. However, it is difficult to visually assess the uniformity of these histograms. A χ 2 test was used to determine the uniformity of the histogram.
The χ 2 distribution is defined as follows:
Note that k = 256 for a grayscale image, and o (i) and e (i) are the observed and expected frequencies of each gray value, respectively. Table 1 shows the test results with different images. The χ 2 statistics of the ciphertext images are all smaller than the theoretical value ''293'', which indicates that the grayscale distribution is approximately uniform. 
C. CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
Reducing the correlation is one of the basic requirements of the encryption scheme. The correlation in the ciphertext image is reduced to a very low level. N pairs of adjacent pixels with gray values as (u i , v i ) are selected from the analyzed image. The correlation coefficient between the vector u = {u i } and v = {v i } is calculated as follows:
Let the u i coordinates be (x i , y i ). If the coordinate of v i is (x i + 1, y i ), the correlation coefficient is calculated along the horizontal direction. If the coordinate v i is (x i , y i + 1), the correlation coefficient is calculated along the vertical direction. If the coordinate of v i is (x i + 1, y i + 1), the correlation coefficient is calculated along the diagonal direction.
We randomly selected ten thousands pairs of adjacent pixels from the plaintext image and the encrypted image. These pairs were used to calculate the correlation coefficient along each direction. Table 2 shows the correlation of two adjacent pixels' results (In table 2 , H, V and D mean Horizontal, Vertical and Diagonal respectively). The correlation for the image 'Baboon' is shown in Figure 7 . It is clear that improved schemes perform well in reducing correlation between adjacent pixels.
D. KEY SPACE AND KEY SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Having a large key space is the basic requirement for a good encryption method. In the improved method, there are 8 parameters which are Ax0, Ay0, Bx0, By0 ∈ (−40, 40), Az0, Bz0 ∈ (1, 81), Aw0, Bw0 ∈ (−250, 250). Assuming the precision is 10 −14 , the size of the key space is 80 ≈ 2 428 , which is over 2 128 . The dimension of the key space is sufficient to prevent search attacks.
Key sensitivity testing is necessary to evaluate an image encryption algorithm. In order to show the key sensitivity of the proposed method, we randomly selected an image with the size of 512 * 512, Image Baboon is used for testing. Figure 8 (a) shows the image Baboon decrypted with the correct key, and Figure 8 (b) -(g) shows the result of the wrong decrypted image obtained by adding 10 −14 to the key Ax0, Ay0,Az0, Aw0, Bx0, By0, Bz0, Bw0. separately. From the results of key sensitivity test, the proposed method is strongly responsive to small variations in the key parameters.
E. DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK ANALYSIS
Plaintext sensitivity requires that a plaintext image with a 1-bit difference can generate completely different cipher images. NPCR and UACI were used to assess plaintext sensitivity. These are defined as follows:
where where C 1 and C 2 are the corresponding cipher images of the two plaintext-images with a 1-bit difference. For an 8-bit gray image, the theoretical value of NPCR and UACI are 99.6094% and 33.4635%, respectively. Table 3 shows a comparison of the NPCR and UACI results for the proposed scheme and the method in Ref. [9] , [34] , [45] . The results from the proposed scheme approximate the theoretical value. Therefore, the proposed scheme can resist a differential attack.
F. INFORMATION ENTROPY ANALYSIS
For images, the higher the information entropy is, the more uniform the gray distribution is, and the less visual information the attacker can get. The information entropy is calculated by Eq. (27) :
where L is the gray level and p (i) is the probability that the gray value i appears. For a random gray image with L = 256, the theoretical value of H is 8. Table 4 shows that H in our method is close to 8. The randomness of image can also be measured by local Shannon entropy which has higher accuracy than that of global entropy which is defined in Eq. (27) . The local Shannon entropy is calculated by
where H (C i ) is calculated by Eq.(27), C 1 , C 2 , . . . C k means k disjoint image blocks. The parameters k and Tb are set to 30 and 1936. Table 5 presents results of local Shannon entropy on test images, from which we can see that the degree of randomness of cipher images is ideal.
G. PSNR ANALYSIS
The PSNR computes the peak signal-to-noise ratio, in decibels, between two images. PSNR is defined as follow: (30) where M, N signify the length and the width of the image, P(i, j) and C(i, j) represent original image and encryption one, respectively, MAX1 denotes the maximum pixel value in the image. The MSE and PSNR comparisons among our algorithm and those in [9] , [20] , [34] , [45] are displayed in Table 6 ,7, respectively. The PSNR of the proposed scheme is comparable to other method in the literature.
H. TIME COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
Here we evaluate the encryption efficiency of the improved encryption method, which was calculated by time complexity analysis. The comparing results of time complexity with existing encryption methods are shown in table 8, for the images with the size of N × N, the proposed algorithm is better than that in Ref. [10] , Ref. [20] , Ref. [34] and is comparative matching Ref. [45] . The algorithm was tested using MATLAB R2016a on a PC with an Intel Core i5 CPU at 2.5GHz and 4G RAM. The average encryption time of encrypting images of size 512 * 512 is 0.951s, and the average decryption time is 1.098s.
VI. CONCLUSION
A plaintext-related image encryption scheme was cryptanalyzed in this paper. We show that this cryptosystem has two vulnerabilities, and that it can be broken by constructing a special image and permuting the permuted image. Moreover, two suggestions for overcoming the nine fixed special position values in the encryption process as well as the reversible feature of the permutation process are provided. Finally, the experimental results and security analysis demonstrate that the improved cryptosystem can provide satisfactory security. In future work, we focus on designing plaintext-related encryption method which can resist noise attack and occlusion attack. We may also set the pixel sum of the plain images and the nine special pixels as secret keys, but how to synchronize these secret keys to different plain images is still under research. 1. Here encrypt (·) is the subprogram of the original encryption scheme G2 = encrypt(G), i.e., image G is encrypted to produce image G2.
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